Switzerland exports hundreds of millions of francs' worth of military equipment every year. Some of its biggest customers are European countries providing military assistance to Ukraine. Yet those same countries cannot always pass Swiss-made weapons on to Kyiv. Why does this happen, and could a nationwide vote on 29 November change the rules?

Imagine Germany purchasing ammunition from Switzerland for its own armed forces. Later, Berlin decides to transfer some of those supplies to Ukraine, where they are urgently needed for defence. But before doing so, Germany may have to ask Switzerland for permission. And Switzerland can refuse.

This is not a hypothetical scenario. In 2022, Germany requested permission to transfer Swiss-made ammunition for Gepard anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine. The Swiss government rejected the request.

The decision illustrates a tension at the heart of Swiss foreign and security policy: a country can maintain a defence industry while imposing strict conditions on how its weapons are used abroad.

To understand why, we need to look at two closely connected, but distinct, things: Switzerland's longstanding policy of neutrality and its national legislation governing arms exports.

Neutrality Does Not Mean Staying Out of the Arms Trade

Switzerland has its own defence industry. Swiss companies manufacture ammunition, armoured vehicles, military equipment and components used in complex weapons systems.

According to the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), Swiss companies exported military equipment worth CHF 948.2 million to 64 countries in 2025, an increase of almost 43% compared with the previous year.

The largest customers were:

• Germany – CHF 386.4 million
• United States – CHF 94.2 million
• Hungary – CHF 63.4 million
• Italy – CHF 62.2 million
• Luxembourg – CHF 47.4 million

Despite these figures, military equipment accounted for just 0.21% of Switzerland's total merchandise exports.

The defence industry is therefore relatively small in the context of the national economy. For individual manufacturers, their employees and international supply chains, however, the sector carries considerably greater weight.

But how does selling weapons fit with neutrality?

Swiss neutrality is often understood abroad as a commitment to staying out of wars. In legal terms, however, it does not mean that Switzerland must avoid all military-related economic activity.

A neutral country may maintain armed forces, operate a defence industry and export military equipment. International neutrality law does, however, impose specific obligations during armed conflicts.

Switzerland applies the principle of equal treatment of parties to an international armed conflict when it comes to supplying military equipment. Its domestic legislation also establishes additional conditions under which arms exports may be approved or refused.

These rules became particularly controversial following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

12,400 Rounds of Ammunition and 22 Armoured Vehicles: Why Bern Said No

In 2022, Germany was preparing to supply Ukraine with Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft systems. Designed to engage aircraft and helicopters, these vehicles can also be used against drones.

There was, however, a problem with ammunition. Some of Germany's available 35 mm ammunition had been manufactured in Switzerland. Berlin therefore requested permission to transfer approximately 12,400 Swiss-made rounds to Ukraine.

The Swiss government refused.

And Germany was not alone. Denmark also sought permission to transfer 22 Swiss-made Piranha III wheeled armoured vehicles to Ukraine. Germany's request additionally concerned Piranha III vehicles originally purchased by Denmark and subsequently stationed in Germany after being withdrawn from service.

On 3 June 2022, the Swiss Federal Council explained why it could not approve the requested transfers. Under the War Materiel Act and Switzerland's neutrality obligations, Swiss-origin military equipment could not be authorised for transfer to Ukraine while the country was involved in an international armed conflict.

The difficulty lies in what happens after a weapon has been sold.

European governments may purchase Swiss military equipment for their own defence, but that does not necessarily give them unrestricted authority to transfer it to another country.

Under Switzerland's existing export-control system, buyers are required in relevant cases to undertake not to transfer military equipment to third countries without Swiss consent. This is known as a re-export restriction.

Even when the intended recipient is a country defending itself against an invasion, such restrictions may prevent a transfer.

For Switzerland, the issue concerns the obligations attached to the original export and the legal limits of its neutrality. For European partners, it raises questions about how freely they can use equipment they have already purchased.

What If a Swiss Component Ends Up in a European Weapon?

There is another, less obvious aspect of Swiss arms-export rules.

In June 2022, the Federal Council considered not only the transfer of complete weapons to Ukraine but also two applications from Swiss companies to supply components to defence manufacturers in Germany and Italy.

One application involved components for anti-tank weapons, while the other concerned parts for air-defence systems.

Both carried the possibility that the components would eventually be incorporated into weapons delivered to Ukraine.

Yet the Swiss government decided that such supplies could continue under the existing rules.

One relevant condition concerns the proportion of Swiss components in the finished product. For the applicable exception, their share must remain below 50% of the finished equipment's total production costs.

In other words, a Swiss-made component may become part of a military system that a foreign manufacturer subsequently supplies to Ukraine. Yet complete Swiss-made ammunition previously purchased by Germany cannot simply be transferred to Kyiv without the necessary authorisation.

Legally, these are two different situations: exporting components for foreign production and re-exporting finished military equipment. In practice, however, both supply chains may ultimately lead to the same destination.

This distinction illustrates how complicated arms-export controls have become in an industry where weapons systems are frequently developed and manufactured across several countries.

Why Swiss Defence Manufacturers Want the Rules Changed

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the debate has extended well beyond Switzerland's relations with Ukraine.

Swiss defence companies operate in an international market where customers consider not only the quality and price of equipment but also the restrictions attached to its future use.

In 2023, Swiss military equipment exports fell by 27%, from approximately CHF 955 million to CHF 696.8 million.

That decline cannot be attributed entirely to neutrality-related restrictions. Nevertheless, industry representatives have reported commercial consequences.

As Reuters reported in March 2024, the Swiss industry association Swissmem linked the loss of some orders to foreign customers' concerns about re-export restrictions. Some companies were also considering reducing investment in Switzerland.

From a customer's perspective, the problem is practical. If military equipment cannot be transferred to a partner during a crisis without additional approval, purchasing it from another supplier may appear more attractive.

For Swiss manufacturers, this creates the risk of losing not only individual contracts but also positions within long-term international defence programmes.

The Federal Council also makes a broader argument concerning Switzerland's own security.

Unlike most of its Western European neighbours, Switzerland is not a NATO member and does not benefit from the alliance's collective-defence guarantees. At the same time, its armed forces depend on international cooperation and foreign suppliers for certain types of equipment.

The government argues that Switzerland must remain a reliable defence-industry partner if it wants to maintain access to essential military technology and supplies during a crisis.

Against this background, the Swiss Parliament approved amendments to the War Materiel Act in December 2025. Opponents subsequently launched a referendum against the changes.

On 29 November 2026, Swiss voters will decide whether the amendments should take effect.

What Would the Reform Actually Change?

The proposed legislation contains three particularly significant changes.

First, Switzerland would be able, under specified conditions, to export military equipment to a group of 36 designated partner countries even if they were involved in an armed conflict. Such exports would still have to comply with international neutrality law and other applicable restrictions.

Second, the Federal Council would gain greater flexibility to depart from the usual export criteria in exceptional circumstances when Swiss national interests required it. International legal obligations would remain binding.

Third, buyers would no longer systematically be required to sign undertakings prohibiting the re-export of Swiss military equipment. Such restrictions could still be imposed when justified by foreign-policy considerations, national security or neutrality obligations.

Importantly, existing re-export undertakings covering equipment already delivered would remain valid.

The third change is especially relevant to Ukraine.

Could Swiss Weapons Eventually Reach Ukraine?

This is where the legal implications become particularly interesting.

In its official explanations of the reform, SECO makes one point clear: direct exports of military equipment from Switzerland to Ukraine would remain prohibited even if the amendments were approved.

The reason is international neutrality law, which the reform would not override.

Nor could the Swiss authorities simply authorise a European country to transfer previously purchased Swiss weapons to Ukraine where such a transfer still required Bern's consent.

But consider a different scenario.

A European country purchases new military equipment for its own armed forces. During the export review, it provides credible assurances that the equipment is intended for its own use, rather than for onward transfer to Ukraine.

Under the proposed rules, Switzerland might approve the sale without requiring the buyer to sign a specific non-re-export undertaking.

If that country later changes its plans and decides to transfer the equipment to Ukraine, such a transfer could, under certain circumstances, become possible without a new Swiss authorisation.

There is, however, an important limitation.

If the Swiss authorities identify a high risk at the time of the original sale that the equipment is actually destined for Ukraine, they would require a non-re-export undertaking. If the risk remained too high, the export application would have to be rejected.

The reform would therefore not provide a legal route for arranging Swiss arms deliveries to Ukraine in advance through intermediaries.

Instead, it could alter the legal situation for certain future transfers that were not planned when the equipment was originally exported.

This is a crucial distinction. The possibility of a later re-export is not the same as Switzerland formally authorising military supplies to Ukraine.

Why Is the Reform Controversial?

Supporters of the amendments emphasise Switzerland's security interests and the need to maintain a viable domestic defence industry.

They argue that export rules must reflect a security environment in which even longstanding partner countries may become involved in armed conflicts.

Opponents see a different danger.

In their view, easing restrictions would weaken Switzerland's ability to control where exported weapons ultimately end up. They warn that military equipment could reach countries with poor human-rights records or other recipients that Switzerland would not normally wish to supply.

The referendum committee opposing the reform argues that the amendments would undermine safeguards designed to prevent such transfers.

The government rejects the suggestion that export controls would disappear. Individual export applications would still require approval, and Switzerland would remain bound by its international obligations.

The disagreement is therefore not about whether arms exports should be regulated at all. It concerns how restrictive that regulation should be and how much discretion the government should have.

For many people in Switzerland, neutrality is also more than a legal framework. It is closely connected to the country's historical experience, independence and understanding of its international role.

That does not mean Swiss society has a single view of what neutrality should look like today. The debate over arms exports reflects precisely these differing interpretations.

Where Does Neutrality End and Responsibility Begin?

Switzerland's arms-export debate reveals how difficult it can be to apply traditional neutrality principles in today's Europe.

Switzerland provides humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, participates in sanctions against Russia and condemns violations of international law. At the same time, its rules on military supplies impose restrictions that apply to parties involved in international armed conflicts.

This position has prompted debate within Switzerland itself. The country recognises Russia's aggression against Ukraine while restricting the transfer of certain weapons that Ukraine needs for its defence.

For the Swiss authorities, the challenge is to uphold international law while preserving the country's neutral status and maintaining its own security.

The vote on 29 November will determine whether Switzerland gives its government greater flexibility in regulating arms exports.

But the broader question will remain: how can a neutral country reconcile its own security, its economic interests and responsibility for what happens to the weapons it sells abroad?

Sources

• Swiss Federal Council – Decisions on transfers of military equipment to Ukraine, 3 June 2022
• SECO – Official information on the vote of 29 November 2026
• SECO – Swiss military equipment exports in 2025
• SECO – Swiss military equipment exports in 2023
• Reuters – Swiss weapons exports plunge as neutral stance hurts trade, 5 March 2024